India needs to consider the risk of nuclear annihilation: Admiral Arun Prakash
Vasco: On December 16, 1971, after 13 days of intense fighting, 93,000 Pakistani troops surrendered to India: the world’s largest surrender in terms of personnel numbers since World War II and a new one from Pakistan. The country, Bangladesh, came.
But since then, warfare has undergone vast changes, largely driven by technology. Former Chief of Naval Staff Admiral (Retd) Arun Prakash, who served in the Indian Air Force during the 1971 Indo-Pak war and was awarded the Vir Chakra for carrying out air strikes deep inside enemy territory, says In the half year since the turn of the century, India has become a nuclear weapon state.
“We are seeing the advent of artificial intelligence, hypersonic weapons, unmanned vehicles, quantum computing and similar technologies. As far as India is concerned, the most important factor that our political leaders and military planners need to take into account is the risk of nuclear annihilation if we come into conflict with China and/or Pakistan, who have large nuclear weapons. Let’s enter. says Arsenal Admiral Arun Prakash.
Asked about the possibility of deploying low-yield nuclear weapons, designated as “tactical nuclear weapons” in the event of a full-scale war in the future, the former Navy chief says the concept is limited only to the Pakistani military establishment. is limited. ,
“India does not distinguish between “tactical” and “strategic” (or high-yield) nuclear weapons. While maintaining a “no first use” stance, India’s official and consistent position has been that it would consider the use of any nuclear weapon (anywhere) against its cities or forces as a nuclear attack on India. Under the 2003 nuclear doctrine, India’s response would be “to cause massive and unacceptable damage,” the admiral says.
“Which means that if an adversary uses a nuclear weapon of any caliber against any target in India or against any of its forces, India will detonate a nuclear bomb on an enemy city of its choice. “However, India also reserves the option of a nuclear response in the event of a major attack with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as biological or chemical weapons, against India or against Indian forces anywhere,” he said.
Despite the advent of advanced technologies, the essential nature of war has not changed significantly.
“All these innovations have been used in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and it can be seen that this 22-month war has retained all the characteristics of a traditional war. There have been periodic threats from Russia, the first country to use nuclear weapons, but the conflict has essentially consisted of fighting between infantry and armored forces, with the occasional use of air power. , And the two sides have been advancing and retreating as before. With no end in sight, this war has also defied predictions that modern wars would be short and intense,” he says.
Speaking about the major lessons of the 1971 war in the present context, the Navy veteran says: “The two salutary lessons that emerged from the 1971 conflict were: The political leadership must clearly explain the objectives of the war and the desired Objectives should be indicated.” Final conditions for the end of the war; That there should be close coordination in the planning and execution of operations between the three armies.”
“The same lesson holds true for future conflicts, except that coordination will no longer suffice on the modern high-tech battlefield and must be replaced by urgent unity, which will require tri-service structures and unity of command. The third lesson that emerged from the 1972 Shimla Accord was that the military should never be kept out of post-war negotiations,” says the Admiral.
